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parties in George v. Bacon 10 and in Levin v. Schickler," but in each
instance the effect was to compel contribution from an indorser who
would not otherwise have been liable. No example of the release
of an accommodation party on the strength of an implied promise
has been found, prior to the principal case.
The decision would appear to make clear, then, that the general
rule has lost none of its force in cases between individuals, despite
the fact that it will no longer be applied when a bank is a party.
And the limitation of the suspension of the rule in bank cases is
well illustrated in Citizens' First Nat. Bank of Frankfort v. Parkinson.12 In that case the accommodation co-maker's defense was that
the bank had neglected to foreclose on collateral security which the
maker had deposited, although the co-maker had demanded that
the bank do so at a time when the security was ample to pay the
note. While recognizing that by the rule in the Shalom and Bergoff
cases, any agreement by the bank to relieve the accommodation
party would be void, the court nevertheless held that the defendant
13
might invoke the equitable doctrine in Pain v. Packard,
and that
the accommodation party was released by the failure of the bank to
respect his right of exoneration. The principal case will distinguish
the rules of construction to be applied to the accommodation party's
undertaking in cases between individuals from those which govern
when a bank is a party. Once the contract has been construed, the
accommodation party in both types of cases will be accorded all the
benefits of the doctrine of strictissinijuris.
H. L. D.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-CHECK USED By AGENT TO PAY
His OWN DEBT TO PAYEE-RIGHT OF MAKER TO RECOVER FROM

PAYEE.-George Shuman, owner of the capital stock of a country
club, induced plaintiff to give him a check for $775 for the purpose
of paying certain deposits to the utilities people which, if not paid,
would jeopardize negotiation of an important contract and bring about
foreclosure of the country club property. Upon these representations
and to provide for these deposits, the plaintiff gave to Shuman his
check for $775 drawn to the order of defendant herein, who was
the president of the country club. Defendant applied the proceeds
of this check in payment of a personal indebtedness owing to him
from Shuman.' At the close of the trial the complaint was dis10 138 App. Div. 208, 123 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1910).
155 Misc. 372, 374, 279 N. Y. Supp. 491, 493 (1935).
12 178 Misc. 630, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 615 (1942).
'1 13 Johns. 174, 7 Am. Dec. 369 (1816).
11

1 An agent must act within authority granted, and persons dealing with an
agent appointed for a particular purpose, must inquire as to the extent of the
agency. See Miles v. Smith, 141 S. E. 314, 37 Ga. App. 619 (1928).

194]

RECENT DECISIONS

missed. Plaintiff requested no ruling that he was entitled to recover
amount of check as a matter of law, but he requested that the case
be submitted to the jury to determine whether defendant was a holder
in due course and took exception to court's ruling.2 Held, judgment
of lower courts in defendant's favor reversed. The check, being
drawn by the plaintiff to the order of defendant, placed on defendant
the duty to inquire as to the apparent title of Shuman, for it imported
on its face that the money represented by it was plaintiff's property. 3
An inquiry would have disclosed that Shuman had no title and was
merely an agent authorized to deliver the check to the defendant, to
be used for a specific purpose. 4 The defendant was, therefore,
chargeable with knowledge of that fact. 5 The possession by Shuman
of the plaintiff's check gave no appearance of authority to use the
check for purposes other than were intended, and the defendant could
not in good faith accept the check and apply the proceeds to the
payment of Shuman's personal indebtedness to him. 6 Possession
alone is insufficient to support a bare appearance of authority. The
use to which defendant put the check was entirely unauthorized. 7
The check itself was constructive notice to plaintiff to inquire of the
principal as to the agent's authority. Defendant was not a bona fide
purchaser for value and a holder in due course because (1) he is
the named payee;8 (2) he could acquire no title from Shuman;9
(3) Shuman was not a remitter;1O (4) there was no privity of contract between maker and payee; and (5) defendant is chargeable with
knowledge of agent's limited authority.'1 Munn v. Boasberg, 266
App. Div. 818, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 573 (1943).
The leading New York case on this point is Sims v. U. S. Trust
Co. 12 In that case a check was delivered to defendant trust company by C, agent for delivery purposes only. Through the negligence
of the teller of the trust company in not observing that these were
funds of a trust, and relying on a power of attorney given many
years before authorizing C to withdraw funds from the bank, the
check was cashed at the direction of C, who absconded with the
funds. The bank was held liable in conversion, for the court held
that a duty of inquiry was placed upon it since the check on its face
gave defendant sufficient notice of the use to which the. proceeds were
2
Hirsch v. Schwartz & Cohn, Inc., 256 N. Y. 7, 175 N. E. 353 (1931).
3 Jackson v. Texas Co., 10 Tenn. App. 235 (1929).
SWalker v. Peake, 153 S. C. 257, 150 S. E. 756 (1929); Bowles Co. v.
Fraser,
59 Wash. 336, 109 Pac. 812 (1910).
5
Hathaway v. County of Delaware, 185 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 153 (1906).
6
Wen ICroy Realty Co. v. Public Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 260 N. Y. 84,
183 N. E. 73 (1932).
78 Walker v. Peake, 153 S. C. 257, 150 S. E. 756 (1929), cited supra note 4.
Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 135 Iowa 350, 112 N. W. 807 (1907).
9 N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW § 98.
10 Armstrong v. Am. Exch. Nat. Bank of Chicago, 133 U. S. 433, 10 Sup.
Ct. 450, 33 L. ed. 747 (1890).
2 Apostoloff v. Levy, 186 App. Div. 767, 170 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1919).
22 103 N. Y. 472, 9 N. E. 605 (1886).
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to be put. The circumstances surrounding the check were suspicious
enough so that the bank was under a duty to inquire as to the extent
of the authority of C. Courts throughout the country are uniform
on the liability of the bank and third persons in similar cases, 13 with
the present decision an expansion of that doctrine. It is sweeping
in its effect and overrules previous limitations established by the
court. No matter how slight may be the grounds for suspicion, nor
how misleading the acts of the agent, where the check is made out
to the order of the defendant and delivered to him by a third person
who has received it from the maker, the court places upon the defendant a duty to inquire. Before he accepts such a check, he must
be certain it was intended for his use. Should he disregard inquiry,
he will be liable in conversion if the agent acted without authority.
K. B.
SECURITIES ACT-SALE OF SECURITIES OVER-THE-COUNTER AT

HIGHER

THAN

PREVAILING

MARKET

PRICES-R VOCATION

OF

BROKER'S REGISTRATION.-Petitioner, an over-the-counter dealer and

broker in securities, after two hearings before the Security Exchange
Commission, had his license revoked for fraud and deceit in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act,' Section 15(c) (1) of the3
Securities Exchange Act, 2 and the Commission's own Rule X-15C1-2.
The dealer's methods of operation were as follows: Prospects, usually
single women or widows with little knowledge of financial transactions, were called to the 'phone or visited in their homes. They
were told of a "wonderful stock", a "marvelous buy", one that was
"beyond the usual". High pressured salesmanship gradually broke
down any resistance, instilled trust and confidence. Sales were
effected at mark-ups ranging from 16.1 per cent to 40.9 per cent above
prevailing market prices without any disclosure of real values and
with little or no risk to the firm involved. 4 Petitioner contended
(1) that Section 15(c) (1) of the Act was unconstitutional and Rule
X-15C1-2 invalid for vagueness, indefiniteness, and uncertainty;
(2) that no violation of Section 17(a) had been shown; and (3) that
the Commission had not offered substantial evidence of current market levels. Held, order affirmed. The standards for interpreting
the Act are set up within the Act itself and are more than adequate.
They make for more definiteness than the standards approved by
See notes 1, 3, 4, 7,10, supra.
148 STAT. 84, 15 U. S. C. §77q (1933).
252 STAT. 1075, 15 U. S.C. § 780(c)(1) (1938).
13

3Acting under its rule-making power, the Commission set up a two-fold
definition of the term "manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent" in its
rule X-15 C 1-2.
4The Commission investigated twenty-seven separate transactions of the
respondent: in six, mark-ups were 30%; in seventeen, 21%-30%; and in four,
16%-20%, above prevailing market prices.

